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The emergence of the COVID-19 virus and global health pandemic has sparked a rapid 
need for new digital solutions. Singapore took a strategic lead by paving the path towards 
innovating digital contact tracing (DCT) technologies to contain the spread of the virus. The 
nation’s expedited response and model for DCT has shown to be one that many countries can 
take example from, regardless of experiencing hurdles in gaining sufficient user uptake initially. 
The concerns surrounding data security and privacy has fueled the movement for DCT 
technologies. With the vast majority of the population being involved, many aspects need to be 
factored in by decision makers for effective deployment. This research provides an extensive 
literature review on Singapore’s government and their implementation of TraceTogether as a 
DCT application during COVID-19. An external and internal analysis is conducted to evaluate the 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of TraceTogether while noting supplemental 
factors that need to be considered in a PESTLE analysis. This study can contribute as a case study 
and be applied to further research on the effectivity of DCT technologies during or after the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  
Introduction 
 Amid the rising spread of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus (SARS-COV-2 or COVID-19), 
growing concerns placed pressure on the World Health Organization (WHO) to denote the virus 
at a higher emergency level. On January 30th of 2020, the WHO held a press briefing and 
declared the virus outbreak a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC). As of 
then, there were already more than 8200 confirmed cases of coronavirus in China and over 170 
deaths, as well as 112 cases that had been identified outside of China in 21 other countries 
(Paton, J., Cortez, M. F., & Bashuck, B. (2020, January 30). Countries and governments all around 
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the world were prompted into quickly finding and innovating effective solutions, safeguarding 
their communities, and taking preventative measures. Case isolation (quarantine, lockdowns) 
and contact tracing are typically used to assist in controlling the spread of highly infectious 
diseases.  
Contact tracing involves identifying and informing individuals who may have come into 
contact with (or been in close proximities with) another individual who has tested positive for 
the COVID-19 virus. Traditional/manual contact tracing is a concept widely adopted by 
governments around the world. However, with rising cases of the COVID-19 virus, its procedures 
for contact tracing deem inefficient enough to control the spread in a timely manner. Many 
have begun to integrate technology in contact tracing to help mitigate the virus swifter and 
more effectively. Various digital proximity tracing tools have been developed and utilized for 
DCT applications.  
This paper highlights the country of Singapore and their strategic management efforts 
during COVID-19 to mediate the spread of the virus through digital technologies. Specifically, we 
look at the TraceTogether DCT application and token which was launched shortly after the start 
of the pandemic, which has now been adopted by over 78% of Singapore’s public residents. 
Background 
PHEIC 
The purpose of declaring a PHEIC is essentially to advise the world on what measures 
should and/or need to be taken to augment global health security by preventing international 
transmission of an infectious disease. During the press brief on Jan 30, Dr. Houssin said declaring 
a PHEIC “is likely to facilitate WHO’s leadership role for public health measures, holding 
countries to account concerning additional measures they may take regarding travel, trade, 
quarantine, or screening, research efforts, global coordination, anticipation of economic impact 
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and support to vulnerable states” (WHO, 2020 March). This works to advise other countries to 
take extended safety measures and implement strategies that will help contain the virus in their 
local communities.  
DCT 
Traditional contact tracing methods are both labor intensive and time consuming. The 
process involves public health officials who interview infected individuals, identify, and advise 
exposed contacts to take required precautions. In cases where individuals are exposed to the 
virus; self-monitoring symptoms, seeking medical evaluation, or quarantine are often urged 
and/or enforced. With the increasing volume of COVID-19 cases, traditional methods are 
difficult to scale and less effective with COVID-19 having a short serial interval (Zhang J, Litvinova 
M, Wang W, 2019). To be entirely effective and efficient, countries need to seek out for 
alternative models, methods, and technology to supplement manual efforts. 
Digital contact tracing (DCT) methods have emerged during the pandemic, to provide a 
more efficient way to trace and mediate the COVID-19 virus. These technologies gather 
electronic information to assist in tracing exposures and infections. Through digital contact 
tracing, limitations of traditional contact tracing such as scalability, recall errors and delays in 
notification are addressed. This technology has the capabilities of enabling more effective 
identifications of contacts in public spaces or areas with larger volumes of people.  
While multiple different paradigms of digital contact tracing exist, most approaches 
have focused on the development of mobile phone applications and technologies, using 
location-based services such as Bluetooth or GPS. These apps are available to anyone that 
possesses a smartphone and can be easily downloaded on an ‘opt-in’ basis. Other countries 
have taken a more aggressive approach through utilizing involuntary data collection systems, 
security camera/video surveillance (CCTV), location data, and financial transactions. While there 
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is a lack of consent from users in these systems, it is not uncommon in countries like China and 
South Korea, where authority is highly centralized. Contrastingly, this kind of system and use of 
data would likely be less effective and accepted in other countries like North America or Europe 
(Kleinman, Robert A, & Merkel, Colin, 2020), where such values of privacy are generally more 
amplified.  
This advancement towards information technology and sharing of data has evolved into 
a field known as ‘infodemiology’, which can be defined as the science of distribution and 
determinants of information through an electronic medium; with the objective to inform public 
health and policies. This database and unstructured data that is derived online can be utilized to 
enhance our knowledge and provide key information about such infectious diseases. This can 
give insight regarding effective containment, prevention, early detection, or even future 
outbreaks. This strong call for technological and location-based solutions paves the way towards 
automation in our digital age. The nature of technological solutions is often favored when 
responding to time-sensitive matters such as the spread of the COVID-19 virus. 
GPS vs. Bluetooth for DCT 
  Both GPS and Bluetooth have been considered for digital contract tracing and 
measuring proximities of individuals. While GPS technologies are widely used for proximity 
tracing and location-based capabilities, it has been determined that 1.5 meters of proximity with 
sufficient exposure to an individual with COVID-19 may result in potential infections 
(Chowdhury, 2020). With that put into consideration, it has become extremely pertinent for 
nations (and organizations) to estimate the distance between individuals and track exposures 
within a community through these technologies and tools. GPS locations are frequently used to 
measure the distance between objects, while taking into account longitude and latitude 
coordinates. Mobile applications use GPS technologies in order to provide more localized 
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services to customers. Although GPS is a popular tool for measuring locations and proximities, it 
is not the most effective tool for contact tracing due to its inability to generate precise locations 
when used indoors. The general accuracy for such GPS technologies is approximately 5 meters in 
distance. As an example, when used for DCT, when users are inside of a building that has 
multiple levels/stories, it can be difficult to pinpoint the exact location of users and whether or 
not they have come into close contact with another user. This can trigger false positives and/or 
create additional ramifications in the contact tracing process including unnecessary exposures 
or quarantine. By capturing the absolute locations of users, there are rising concerns of possible 
surveillance and location privacy through this technology that must be addressed by governing 
entities. Along with this can come other psychological, financial, and social tolls (Kleinman, 
Robert A, & Merkel, Colin, 2020). This indicates a high level of importance for generating a 
reliable platform that users/populations can put their full trust and data into. 
 Bluetooth technology has been used in attempts to try and overcome these 
technological barriers. Bluetooth has been a leading successor for wireless localization of 
individuals and their smartphone devices. Traditionally, Bluetooth was critiqued for having a 
lengthy scan time of roughly 10 seconds, which limited the value it had for localization purposes. 
A new protocol labeled Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) has allowed Bluetooth to overcome these 
limitations (Chowdhury, M., 2020).  This new protocol has been widely supported by a vast 
majority of different smart devices since 2015 as a wireless proximity technology, and is 
superior because of its low cost, power saving features, small size, and commonality. The 
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) from Bluetooth channels are used to approximate 
proximities through the technology. The DCT applications that use Bluetooth use these RSSI 
values to calculate distance between individuals. These readings, nonetheless, can vary between 
devices as a consequence of different models, signal strengths, and operating systems. When 
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used for DCT, these factors need to be considered to accurately evaluate proximities. While the 
Bluetooth technology does not acquire absolute locations of individuals, it records data on other 
Bluetooth devices that are within the radio range. The technology alone does not affirm where 
the interaction has occurred, but rather the time and duration of contact. This makes Bluetooth 
a more favorable tool as it provides a greater level of protection against location privacy, 
surveillance, and breach of civil liberties. 
Literature Review 
Singapore’s Smart Nation Initiative 
Singapore’s Smart Nation Initiative encompasses the idea of harnessing technology to 
stay ahead as a global city and to improve the livelihood of the residents of Singapore. Growing 
urban complexity and economic digitization drove Singapore to form its Smart Nation Initiative 
which focuses on the mobility and application of advanced digital and info communications 
technology (ICT) to solve complex urban problems. This has come to include the COVID-19 
pandemic. In addition, the initiative represents an opportunity for Singapore to explore 
potential new areas of growth and prosperity associated with its new digital economy. 
Furthermore, the Smart Nation initiative also gave rise to shifts in Singapore’s approach to 
public administration within its own borders (Jie, 2018). The Smart Nation Initiative in Singapore 
emphasized urban digitization in five key domains: transportation, home and environment, 
business productivity, health and technology enabled ageing, as well as public sector services 
(Digital Government Office (DGO), 2018). Although the country was one of the first countries in 
Asia to introduce a broadband internet infrastructure, over the past years Singapore has 
struggled in gaining global recognition as a country that pioneers in technology. This Smart 
Nation Initiative was developed to complement and supplement Singapore’s growth in global 
financial status and media hub status (Lee, 2016). 
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At the launch of Singapore’s Smart Nation initiative, Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee 
Hsien Loong (2014) spoke about the movement describing that: ‘One important advantage 
which we have which we must take full advantage of is to use technology extensively and 
systematically, particularly IT. Not just piecemeal, individual gadgets, individual programs, and 
systems - that we are already doing, and all sorts of devices and applications have technology 
and IT in them… we have to do this systematically, to make the most potential, to integrate all of 
the technology and possibilities into coherent and comprehensive whole. This will make our 
economy more productive, our lives better and our society more responsive to our people’s needs 
and aspirations’. The initiative was meant to represent Singapore’s progressiveness as a country 
and has thus become a platform for Singapore to become frontiers in innovating digital 
solutions for reducing the spread of the COVID-19 virus. 
GovTech  
The Government Technology Agency of Singapore, known as GovTech, is the main arm 
of government responsible for implementing the initiatives from the Smart Nation and Digital 
Government Office (Lee, T. Lee, H. 2020). Moreover, the main role of GovTech is to drive digital 
transformation of Singapore’s public sector, from health, transportation, education, 
infrastructure, to areas of information technology and other public platforms. The initiative 
worked with government agencies to develop and deliver secure digital services and applied 
technology to individuals and businesses in Singapore. GovTech’s main mission is to deliver user-
centric services for the benefit of Singapore and its citizens. In addition, GovTech aspires to 
empower the nation of Singapore through using technology and applying them to different roles 
in the community. The initiative works towards sparking new pilot technologies, building 
products, systems, and applications that contributes to Singapore becoming a smart city. This 
centers around operating large scale systems that help properly govern and manage 
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government ICT standards. Moreover, this contributed to Govtech’s growth of engineering 
capabilities and international recognition through providing innovative solutions and 
infrastructure to the population.  
Singpass is a core example of a platform launched by GovTech in 2003 that provides a 
gateway for the population of Singapore to multiple government-based digital services. This 
technology has become a widely used platform for the population of Singapore, building on the 
country’s progression towards its Smart Nation Initiative. The platform enabled residents of 
Singapore to have a channel where they can securely access different government and private 
sector services both online and in-person. This exemplifies how GovTech is fueled by the 
eagerness of Singaporeans to create a robust platform that will make Singapore the forefront of 
global digital transformation. Singapore is paving a path towards establishing their legacy as 
pioneers and leaders in the digital era, and there are many lessons to be learned from their 
achievements (and/or failures).  
Singapore’s TraceTogether 
Singapore’s government used many different strategies and technologies to manage the 
virus through its Smart-Nation Initiative led by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vivian Balakrishnan. 
Singapore was one of the first countries leading a digital contact tracing (DCT) initiative to 
minimize the spread of COVID-19 at the start of the pandemic. The government technology 
agency in Singapore, GovTech along with senior director, Jason Bay, was quick to respond, and 
led the development of a Bluetooth-based smartphone application ‘TraceTogether’ that is 
utilized in Singapore to complement current containment efforts. The TraceTogether application 
was designed to help reduce the spread of the virus by tracing contacts linked to COVID-19 
positive cases that were found in Singapore. GovTech has also released an open-source version 
of the platform known as OpenTrace, which is available to other countries and governments 
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alongside a white paper describing the custom protocol used by TraceTogether, labeled as 
BlueTrace. Multiple other governments have taken interest in adapting the open-sourced 
technology and application for their country to help flatten the curve of the COVID-19 virus.  
The TraceTogether application and technology functions on Bluetooth or ‘digital 
handshakes’ that are generated wirelessly to exchange data between different devices that are 
at close proximities, up to 10 meters away. The application works by attaching a randomized 
user ID that is constantly refreshed, to a registered phone number of the user. The platform 
would then proceed to exchange these temporary ID’s or data to timestamp and log difference 
occurrences between users at close proximities. With users needing to give informed consent to 
this application, this data is stored locally on user devices, and it was determined that the data 
would not be allowed to be uploaded to any centralized servers or cloud systems. The data 
stored would be kept for a 25-day period, and the database would be terminated at the end of 
the COVID-19 health pandemic or crisis (Weiss, M. B., & Mehta, S., 2020). The TraceTogether 
app works hand-in-hand with the SafeEntry feature, which includes a function for users to scan 
the SafeEntry QR codes that are displayed at public venues for a secured check-in. 
SafeEntry / SGWorkPass  
 SafeEntry is a free cloud-based platform or system that allows visitors to register or 
check-in to public locations or businesses, contrasting from TraceTogether which is an app that 
functions by exchange of anonymized identifiers and data between devices through Bluetooth 
at close proximities (Sheng Lai, S. H., Ying Tang, C. Q., Kurup, A., & Thevendran, G., 2020). 
SGWorkPass was released as a result of high cases being identified in a segment of the 
population attributable to low-wage workers living in dormitories or cramped conditions (Lee, 
Terence & Lee, Howard, 2020). This portion of the public as well as younger or elderly citizens 
are more sensitive to the virus, and unable to fully utilize the proposed benefits of the digital 
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contact tracing technologies of the TraceTogether application. SGWorkPass is a free mobile 
application supported by the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) of Singapore and the application 
enables the population to validate their work passes and check their health or access code 
statuses in order to determine whether or not they are able to leave or attend to work. Users 
simply use the SGWorkPass platform to scan the QR codes of a work-pass or long-term pass card 
from their mobile devices that has been issued by the MOM which is then verified using the 
application. 
The SafeEntry platform was more publicized than TraceTogether by the Singapore 
government at the start of the pandemic due to higher cases in lower class living conditions and 
was highly encouraged amongst groups and businesses to ease challenges of manual contact 
tracing efforts. The application quickly caught on, as it was required in Singapore to gain access 
to many facilities and locations. Singapore made it mandatory (by law) for workplaces to have 
some kind of system in place to log entries and exits of employees and visitors from workplaces 
for various contact tracing purposes as the pandemic progressed. These measures 
complemented TraceTogether’s system and worked to prevent and avoid transmission of 
COVID-19 across workplace premises within Singapore. The data collected is encrypted, with the 
database only being accessible to authorized public health officers for purposes of contact 
tracing. The SafeEntry application managed to gain a more positive responsive and adoption 
rate amongst the population and essential services in comparison to TraceTogether initially. 
Moreover, SafeEntry is compatible with both TraceTogether and SingPass, which increased 
accessibility to the public residents of Singapore. The technologies all worked to complement 




 The fundamental difference between a centralized and decentralized tracking system 
lies with the accessibility of such data. Decentralized systems are depicted to better protect user 
privacy. TraceTogether takes on a more centralized approach, where central authorities issue 
encrypted identifiers to each device. These identifiers are broadcasted via Bluetooth technology, 
and record data between devices (Bay, J., Kek, J., Tan, A., Hau, C. S., Tan, J., Yongquan, L., & Quy, 
T. A., n.d.). That considered, the central authority has the power to decrypt such identifiers and 
map potential risks between various individuals. This has largely influenced the resistance and 
reluctance of the population that TraceTogether’s technology experienced initially since the 
government never really clarified or addressed such effects and processes to the public nor 
demonstrated any effectual actions to confront user concerns. 
Tokens 
The TraceTogether technology offered a token option that they began to distribute at 38 
community centers and 13 mobile booths/kiosks in September 2020. The token comes with a 
QR code that can be scanned for entry. Businesses that utilize this system will need to download 
a separate scanning app for SafeEntry businesses that enable them to scan QR codes on user 
tokens. Many considerations were made before TraceTogether’s tokens were launched, 
including the choice to make the application mandatory to citizens. While this move would 
contradict the promises initially made by the Singapore government, the decision was made to 
pivot towards launching and distributing tokens primarily to support Singapore residents who 
do not own a smartphone or residents with workplace restrictions. The physical token helps to 
increase the optimal number of users required for the contact tracing system to work well. As 
many concerns revolved around the juxtaposition of privacy and benefits of using the 
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application, TraceTogether’s approach was still considered less intrusive than approaches taken 
by other countries such as China and South Korea where power and authority is more 
centralized and/or enforced. These technological tokens were implemented in efforts to 
alleviate the issues surrounding user adoption in populations that did not have access to 
smartphones and/or respond to privacy entanglements. The wearable technology was to 
complement the TraceTogether app and manual contract tracing efforts, while bypassing the 
various technical issues of technological compatibility. Still, concerns about data privacy and 
security intensified in Singapore with more and more of the population fearing government 
surveillance through their personal smartphones. 
TraceTogether Timeline & Adoption 
The TraceTogether application was quickly launched at the start of COVID-19 on March 
20th of 2020 when Singapore’s government mandated a 2-week circuit break. Initially, the 
application development process was developed within a short time frame as GovTech and the 
Ministry of Health (MOH) rushed to ensure that the efforts of traditional contact tracing were 
supplemented by this digital technology or mobile application. The development process faced 
several technical challenges and concerns including gaining user adoption, Bluetooth 
proximities, compatibility with Apple operating systems/devices, battery drainage, and data 
privacy. Although the government supported and backed this application, it was not enforced as 
mandatory when it was initially released until December of 2020. With downloads and adoption 
being voluntary, and the application struggled to generate a sufficient number of users in the 
beginning. Uptake after the first month of being deployed was slightly over 1 million downloads, 
which represented only 20% of the population. In order for such digital contact tracing 
technologies to be deemed effective, it is said that 60% of user compliance is required from the 
resident population. By December 14th of 2020, after the government announced that checking 
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in with the token or app will be mandatory for all public venues in Singapore, TraceTogether 
reached this adoption rate of the app and token. As of January 2021, the TraceTogether app has 
now gained over 4 million downloads and users exceeding 78% of Singapore’s resident 
population (Yuen-C, T., 2021). Of these people, only around 2 million users solely use the mobile 
application, while the large majority of users favor using the physical token option. As collection 
venues increased to 108 locations, distribution of tokens was temporarily halted. Initially, the 
Government had not expected such a strong demand for the tokens given the fact that people 
could just easily download the application. There was a shortage due to some delays in the 
manufacturing schedule, and the distribution of tokens could not be completed across all the 
community centers. Users were able to use the Token Go Where website 
(Token.gowhere.gov.sg) provided by Singapore’s government to locate local distribution venues 
in their areas. This platform also displayed venue details and whether or not the location had 
tokens in stock. Distribution resumed shortly after the shortage, as the population of Singapore 
was prompted and required to use TraceTogether at all SafeEntry checkpoints either via the 
token or the app. Effective February 1st of 2021, tokens were made available at any community 
center or club, readily and easily accessible to all the residents of Singapore. 
CPC & The COVID-19 Amendment Bill  
In January of 2021, Singapore’s Minister of State for Home Affairs, Desmond Tan 
revealed in parliament that the data gathered from TraceTogether’s application could be 
accessed by Singaporean police for criminal investigations, under the Criminal Procedure Code 
(CPC). This formalized authoritative use of legal powers and contradicted the previous 
assurances that were given by Minister Balakrishnan, Lawrence Wong, and Teo Chee Hein that 
data would only be used to track the spread of infections. There were concerns that this 
revelation may impact uptake or cause users to disable the application. The government stated 
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that the use of data would be restricted to seven serious offenses which include murder, sexual 
assault, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. Minister Balakrishnan spoke out about the pivot, 
painting it as a national safeguard and ensuring the public they were entitled to any 
disappointment or negative feelings they had towards his mistake. Adding in “but don’t deprive 
yourself and your loved ones of the protection of this system” (Policy, P., Chee, P., & Says, S., 
2021). 
In February 2021, the COVID-19 (Temporary measures) amendment bill was passed by 
Singapore parliament on a Certificate of Urgency. This was urged by public outcry and questions 
that were raised in parliament by the Leader of the Opposition, Worker’s Party chief Pritam 
Singh regarding the misrepresentation around TraceTogether data being used for contact 
tracing purposes only. These issues were addressed through the passing of the bill, to ensure a 
level of transparency from the Singapore government to the public (Chee, K., & Yuen-C, T., 
2021).  
Australia 
Australia is a good example of a country that took TraceTogether’s open-sourced model 
and strategically sought to build and develop the model for their country through an app called 
COVIDSafe. Essentially, Australia addressed many issues and took from many lessons learned 
that TraceTogether had with its implementation in Singapore before lifting self-isolation orders 
in May of 2020 (Abbas Roba & Michael Katina, 2020). While not much action was taken in 
Singapore to address privacy policies at the start of the launch, Australia was quick to consider 
user concerns and learn from TraceTogether while adapting to local requirements. A major area 
Australia enhanced was safeguarding user data privacy, through building their system around 
voluntary uptake of users, where data is protected by legal legislation. Upon the release of 
COVIDSafe, interim privacy protections were released to support the application under the 
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Biosecurity Act of 2015. The Australian government also swiftly passed the Privacy Amendment 
Act (Public Health Contact Information) to supplement the app in providing privacy protections 
to users (Australian Government, Information Law Unit, 2020). This was a step that was not 
taken nor considered by Singapore with its implementation of TraceTogether at the release of 
the application. This legislation highlighted several different offences that are associated with 
COVID-19 application data that outlines non-permitted use or disclosures. Nonetheless, with the 
bill being passed in Australia, there were still several flaws to the model and system. Singapore 
quickly followed this example by releasing its COVID-19 Amendment Bill to safeguard user 
privacy and data when public concerns were escalated. This application-based contact tracing 
system embedded a deepening of technologies of surveillance in the social life of users. Most of 
these concerns were justified by public health measures critical to the emergency conditions of 
the pandemic. Users are still worried however, that this kind of surveillance will not be 
completely retracted once the pandemic subsides (Goggin, G, 2020).  
Data processes for Australia’s COVIDSafe application was contracted to Amazon Web 
Services (AWS), a U.S. based company. This move and development caused concerns for the 
population of Australia that such data would be accessed by US law enforcement. While the 
database would be managed through AWS’s key management system, all of the data would be 
kept in Australia. Government services minister Stuart Robert reassured the Australian 
population that “Uploaded contact information will be stored in Australia in a highly secure 
information storage system and protected by additional laws to restrict access to health 
professionals only. Australia has not passed legislation that would allow it to operate and share 
data under the US CLOUD Act” (Sadler, D, 2020).  
A major distinction between Australia and Singapore is the level of transparency 
towards the population. Australia was able to build and retain more trust from its public when 
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juxtaposed with Singapore’s original TraceTogether model.  While Australia was able to gain a 
slightly larger adoption rate of the population in shorter time than Singapore (Abbas Roba & 
Michael Katina, 2020), research shows that the app still pertained some flaws. There still 
remained issues with connectivity to other devices, and electromagnetic interference issues for 
those who are diabetic (and use an app to monitor glucose), use implantables, and/or other 
remote programmer devices. Additionally, Australia was able to bypass the complications 
associated with the compatibility to Apple IOS systems. However, none of this data or 
information was ever released to the public.  
Apple and Google’s Exposure Notification 
 With TraceTogether experiencing issues of compatibility with Apple IOS systems and 
battery drainage, other firms sought out solutions for mediating the spread of the COVID-19 
virus. Another leading DCT technology that has emerged out of the COVID-19 global health 
pandemic was derived from a collaboration of two leading tech-giants who control the two most 
popular smartphone operating systems, Apple, and Google. This platform has seemed to receive 
greater global uptake due to its outreach. The biggest privacy concerns with DCT have been the 
appropriateness of data flows from user devices. Exposure notification has been more largely 
received by the public due to the measures taken to ensure data privacy and security for users 
(Whittaker, 2020). The exposure notification system’s application programming interface (API) 
utilizes Bluetooth for proximity tracing for privacy preservation, similar to TraceTogether’s 
system.  
Integrating DCT 
Literature is rich with depicting how digital contact tracing mobile apps have emerged as 
important and effective tools in an integrated strategy of infection containment in post-
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lockdown societies around the globe. However, given that the pandemic has made it easier for 
societies to adapt to new technologies for the assuring health precautions, a number of 
questions have been raised and need to be addressed when assessing the ethical challenges of 
mobile applications for digital contact-tracing of COVID-19. Which safeguards should be 
embedded in the technology? Who should have access to such data? What is the role for big 
technology companies in the development and implementation of these systems? How should 
cultural and behavioral issues be accounted for in the design of these apps? Should use of these 
apps be compulsory? What does transparency and ethical oversight mean in this context? 
(Lucivero, F., Hallowell, N., Johnson, S. et al. 2020). Literature states that these questions need 
to be addressed thoroughly to facilitate the effective transfer of technologies such as DCT. It has 
become clear that the concept of adopting DCT by any country, society or community will be 
difficult as there are so many dimensions and factors questioning the integrity or the ethics of 
the technology. Subsequently, the technology transfer of DCT has faced and will continue to 
face many obstacles and resistance. Thus, countries and decision makers need to take a 
strategic approach when addressing the concerns of the population to create a dynamic 
platform of DCT that can be modified and optimized to assure full support and acceptance from 
countries and societies at large. 
Analysis 
Internal analysis (Strengths, Opportunities) 
 For this paper, a SWOT analysis was generated that digs deeper into the strengths, 
weaknesses, threats, and opportunities of TraceTogether. A strength for TraceTogether and 
Singapore’s government has been its wide recognition for crisis response and management. By 
providing a quick response in the span of eight weeks, Singapore paved the way towards DCT 
and innovating technological solutions during the pandemic. This was the first contact tracing 
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technology deployed during COVID-19. Releasing this technology to the public as an open-
sourced application reflects positively on TraceTogether and Singapore by showing that they 
value alleviating the virus and the good of the people over profitability. It was also a great 
opportunity for Singapore to exemplify its technological expertise and credentials to the world 
as core competencies (Lee, Terence & Lee, Howard, 2020). Being open sourced played as a 
strength as well as an opportunity for the firm. Other countries and communities can learn from 
the TraceTogether model, just as TraceTogether can learn from other developments. This kind 
of stride can lead to further innovations in the model and increases the potential for the 
technology to grow or expand.  
Being a government owned entity, TraceTogether can reap the benefits of having the 
support, resources, power, and influence of the Singapore government. The culture in Singapore 
is pertinent to this, as citizens of Singapore have a high level of respect and loyalty towards their 
local government. With there being a positive connotation towards government mandates and 
law enforcement, the population is more likely to adhere and adopt new protocols. This in turn, 
can contribute to improved containment and mediation of the COVID-19 virus.  
Providing additional alternatives such as physical tokens and cryptographically 
generated temporary user ID's is a strong point for TraceTogether in trying to address user 
concerns and data capabilities. By making the technology accessible both virtually and locally to 
the population through token collection booths/venues, more user adoption can be expected. 
TraceTogether took the opportunity after the circuit break by distributing tokens to those who 
are not as digitally connected as mobile phone users. This move seems to have worked in 
bridging the gap in digital divide (Lee, Terence & Lee, Howard, 2020). Singapore strategically 
utilized the opportunity to exploit the token option for wider distribution and adoption, and this 
was reflected in the soaring demand of tokens that swept the population. 
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SafeEntry was released alongside TraceTogether in Singapore to promote contact 
tracing in groups and organizations. TraceTogether was able to seize this opportunity to create a 
platform for businesses and individuals to check in into locations for ease of contact tracing and 
to reduce the need for manual efforts that are required to log each entry and exit of visitors. 
TraceTogether and SafeEntry are compatible with each other, allowing TraceTogether tokens or 
QR codes to be used for scanning at SafeEntry checkpoints. This supplemental platform is a 
strength for the firm because it boosts and supports the recognition (and adoption) of 
TraceTogether’s technology.  
External analysis (Weaknesses, Threats) 
The race against time presented several issues that the TraceTogether team needed to 
address before and during the development phase to ensure that no laws were violated in the 
process. One of the issues that comes out clearly in the development of Trace Together is 
transparency. The application that was launched was aimed to gain as many downloads as 
possible in order to achieve the collective goal of contact tracing. A clear weakness or threat was 
the reliance on the adoption of users to the app, that influenced effectivity. The application is 
dependent on the degree of user adoption, and TraceTogether did not end up reaching the 
volume of adoption it had sought out to until the end of 2020. Most of this was influenced by 
user resistance or distrust in data systems and security measures. With the Singapore 
government muting the concerns around data privacy, this was not effective in promoting 
adoption amongst the population. It was important that the application and its functionality be 
seen as transparent and secure as possible to the public. However, this could not be achieved 
without addressing issues like civil liberties and privacy of data gathered. Previous experience 
had brought hard lessons, when it came to health systems and the high levels of sensitivity 
associated with such data. GovTech needed to ensure it would gain public trust and take 
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precautions to avoid vulnerability of data misuse or security breaches that could hinder 
effectiveness of DCT methods. Ensuring that the data was stored locally within a user’s mobile 
phone was a critical way of reducing focus on one central server. The application was also not 
expected to interfere with civil liberties like the right to privacy; and therefore, Trace Together 
was expected to work without revealing to other users the location or personal details of a 
particular user. Unique user IDs and physical tokens attached to the mobile phone of users who 
downloaded the application was utilized to further safeguard privacy.  
There were other technical challenges and limitations that arose for TraceTogether’s 
technology with its rapid launch. The application faced issues with compatibility when running 
on the Apple IOS system, only being able to function properly in the foreground and not the 
background. Advisements were given to bypass such technical complications for iPhone users, 
but Apple refused requests to remove these restrictions. Since this particular system does not 
allow applications to run in the background, it would be hard to make sure that the Bluetooth 
based functionality would be effective for iPhone users. Users were briefed to keep the 
application running on their phones with the screen facing down and unlocked. However, this 
prevented users from being able to use any other functions or apps on their phones without the 
application being interrupted. The application also posed issues of battery drainage when 
running on both the foreground and background which also reduced the sensitivity of the app if 
users do not adhere to the proposed recommendations to hurdle such challenges. There was 
little advice given or actions taken to bypass such user effects so using the DCT application was 
perceived as burdensome and inconvenient for users.  
On top of the difficulties with the Apple IOS system, TraceTogether’s choice of utilizing 
Bluetooth technology posed potential weaknesses for the firm when pinpointing proximities. 
Bluetooth-based apps and signal strengths are hardware dependent and can fluctuate between 
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devices. Bluetooth is designed as a low power or low energy communication technology, not 
intended to facilitate range finding like digital contact tracing systems require. Measuring the 
distance between devices based on the received signal strengths of each individual device is 
challenging, with signal strengths being relative not absolute. Marginal errors were common, as 
it can be influenced by many external factors in the environment, devices, or signal powers 
(Leins, Kobi, Culnane, Christopher, & Rubinstein, Benjamin IP., 2020). The precision in location-
based measurements and proximities can be limited, generating root-mean-square errors 
between 3m and 16m at different testing sites as well as times (K, Merry & Bettinger, P, 2019). 
False positives or identification can have large effects and ramifications that result in 
unnecessary exposures as well as psychological, financial, and social tolls (Kleinman, Robert A, & 
Merkel, Colin, 2020).  This could also be ascertained within field and indoor testing. Time 
pressures thrusted the application into launch with key concerns not being entirely addressed. 
This caused technical debts for Singapore, needing to rework and update the application to 
improve critical issues. This could have been avoided had GovTech and Singapore taken 
additional time to consider a more careful approach rather than being so concerned with being 
the first to respond to the crisis.  
With there being a portion of the population that does not own or have access to 
smartphones, this was a weak point in the model. It does not account for accessibility to more 
vulnerable individuals, including the elderly, children, migrants, and others who may have 
cognitive impairment or unable to speak/read English. This was partially addressed through the 
release of TraceTogether tokens, as well as token collection booths. Nonetheless, issues of 
privacy and growing concerns of location tracking are still influential threats to this, as well 
government narrative on making this technology non-mandatory to mandatory.  
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The 2-week ‘circuit break’ mandated by the Singapore government refers to the 
enforcement of strict measures to slow down the spread of the disease which consequently 
worked against the idea of the application. These measures restricted human interactions and 
movements, therefore making it more difficult to portray or prove the effectiveness of the 
application. The increase of self-isolation and quarantine measures that spread across the 
country (as well as the globe) decreased the significance and value of such DCT models. While 
this was a threat to TraceTogether, it also allowed the organization time to re-strategize how 
they will relaunch after the mandate. However, even after the circuit break, TraceTogether still 
slowly struggled to gain the adoption of users. In addition, little to no cases were found through 
the app at the point of the circuit break, considering that traditional manual contact tracing was 
still intact. This lack of evidence or results became a threat to TraceTogether, which made 
managing user expectations difficult. There was no communication to users that displayed proof 
of effectiveness, and users were still reluctant to comply due to privacy and sharing issues.  
This brings us to another weakness or threat that is pertinent to TraceTogether’s 
technology which is the trade-off between privacy and effectiveness. While user’s increasing 
reluctance towards privacy and data deem to be a threat to TraceTogether, the firm has 
continuously brushed off these concerns, by not fully addressing them to the public. The 
narrative provided by the government explains technological aspects and set-ups rather than 
providing formalized guarantees against the abuse or misuse of technology (Kleinman, Robert A, 
& Merkel, Colin, 2020). This becomes both a weakness and threat for TraceTogether, as it 
creates uncertainty around government intent with data being easily decrypted by those who 
have access. TraceTogether currently uses a hybrid system to store data but leans more towards 
being centralized as the government is highly involved in the process. Meaning that when cases 
are identified, the government has the ability to access (or decrypt) user information, data and 
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contacts that can infer a lot about a user's locations or habits. The limits of this data collection 
and storage were just recently addressed through the COVID-19 Amendment Bill that was 
passed, many months after the deployment of the DCT technology.  
With that, there are possible threats of substitutes applications becoming more 
dominant amongst the public, including the use of closed-circuit television video surveillance 
(CCTV) by the governments to track movements. A report was done in Singapore and various 
attitudes towards data privacy. This study finds that while 60% of respondents supported the 
use of CCTV to monitor movements during the pandemic or circuit break, less than 50% felt 
comfortable with having their mobile data tracked or used for contact tracing without consent 
(Tay, 2020). With TraceTogether being an open-sourced app, other technologies can easily learn 
and develop from the model. Having clear flaws in its initial model, Singapore could have easily 
become overshadowed by those who choose to adapt their technology or appeal safer, posing 
threats of losing competitive advantage or loosing their image of being technological innovators. 
PESTLE Analysis 
Political 
 Being that TraceTogether is stemmed from a government entity, political influences are 
critical to Singapore and the firm. The government-imposed protocols, mandates, as well as 
lockdowns/quarantines that restrict individuals and businesses from regular operations. Trust in 
government is relevant as it impacts conformity with the majority of the population being 
reluctant to share data with there being a lack of user privacy rights laws or policies to protect 
them. However, trust in government can also help to support the passing of such regulations, if 
willingly adopted by the majority of the population. It can be argued that DCT technologies are 
highly political as they are often controlled by government-led public health systems (McDonald 
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S, 2020). Deployment of this technology and application is shaped by the people and institutions 
it connects, as well as the authority that is exercised based on that data. 
Economical 
 Economic conditions are critical influences in the implementation of DCTsystems like 
TraceTogether. COVID-19 and the global health pandemic has brought upon many direct and 
indirect impacts to businesses and individuals with new protocols put in place. Market 
performance has slowed during the pandemic, and economic growth has become stunted as 
unemployment rates increase and labor hours decrease. As more individuals fall ill, COVID-19 is 
likely to cause a temporary shortage or lack of workers putting pressure on governments to find 
laborers. As many businesses begin to halt, this can hinder economic output of a country. With 
the number of working hours being limited, consumer spending habits have altered as well, 
putting pressure on certain goods and services while others decline. As a consequence, the 
uncertainty of economic conditions can be influential to growth and adoption of technologies. 
Economic strain can inhibit the ability to buy smartphones for younger or elder populations, 
resulting in individuals that would not be able to utilize the application and therefore limit 
tracing capabilities. Large investments in these technologies would also be required from the 
government, as well as for market research to derive an inclusive approach.   
Social 
 TraceTogether’s case is highly impacted by social factors within its external 
environment. Multiple aspects are considered, including population demographics, lifestyle 
factors, in addition to consumer trends, taste, habits and attitudes. These factors significantly 
influence the level of technological adoption. Different attitudes and views towards such DCT 
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technologies or systems can be tied to population infection rates, health consciousness, 
government-imposed mandates, and data privacy concerns.  
There have been higher levels of stress, panic, and anxiety as a result of this pandemic 
and the effects are highly visible throughout the many cities around the world. While social 
distancing protocols are widely practiced, individuals anticipating staying home for extended 
periods of time might take extreme precautions or other anticipatory measures including 
stocking up on home goods. This was seen early on in the pandemic through the empty shelves 
in supermarkets, and a shortage of toilet paper as supply chains were temporarily disrupted due 
to this panic. 
Technological 
 Technological external factors that should be considered include smartphone users (and 
owners), the level of user-friendliness of the application, as well as competing technologies that 
may emerge from having an open-sourced model. Moreover, the variety of phone types, 
software and cyber securities capabilities all act as an obstacle for creating a “one app for all”. It 
is critical to assess each technology factor solely first, then how each factor impacts other 
variables. In addition, the accuracy of the TraceTogether Bluetooth is associated with false 
inaccurate digital tracing, thus technology can lead to ineffective digital tracing if the platform is 
not optimized. Furthermore, there is a need for constant innovation and analytics to improve 
this technology and its accuracy to aid rapid testing.  Factors relating to data storage 
confidentiality, user rights, and risks must be considered and properly addressed to prove 




Legal external factors are extremely relevant as it pertains to different data privacy laws, 
legislations, antitrust, employment, labor laws, along with health and safety regulations that 
influence DCT technologies. Moreover, GovTech’s team was aware that concerns on data 
privacy from a legal perspective would arise, yet they proceeded with the TraceTogether 
initiative regardless without fully addressing these issues at the start. Nonetheless, bridging the 
legal gap is needed to ensure citizens cooperate and drive the digital tracing initiative to success. 
This can be reflected in the COVID-19 Amendment Bill that Singapore later released.  
Environmental 
 Environmental factors can extend to future pandemics, environmental restrictions 
imposed on the population, as well as the development of infrastructure inside and outside of 
Singapore. Travel restrictions and fear of traveling can also be considered as motivation to use 
the app or platform with geographical location being highly influential with DCT technologies. 
This COVID-19 virus and global health pandemic can be considered in the same category as a 
natural disaster or crisis, one that nobody could have predicted.  
Discussion 
 Countries should take Singapore as a prime example and model when considering the 
choice of implementing DCT applications and technologies. There have been many lessons to be 
learned from TraceTogether’s release in Singapore. A main point that can be highlighted 
through this extensive literature review is how one successful strategy is not always applicable 
or universal to every country or community due to differences in culture, attitudes, and 
demographics. There are many external and internal factors that need to be considered when 
choosing effective strategies for mediating the virus using DCT technologies. While Singapore 
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may possess core competencies in technological innovation, these capabilities were not fully 
realized by the public and population until many months into the pandemic. Much of the 
literature that we have covered has emphasized the significance of acknowledging the various 
concerns around data privacy and surveillance. These perspectives have altered the effectivity 
of such DCT technologies since they influence adoption rates. By lacking transparency and not 
fully addressing data privacy issues or taking action to pass a bill or legislation from the get-go, 
this reflected poorly on the Singapore government (as well as GovTech) and has added to user 
resistance. The narrative from the Singapore government on DCT technologies fluctuated and 
flip-flopped throughout 2020, before the bill was passed at the start of 2021. Nonetheless, the 
nation was still able to accumulate a large adoption rate and overcome these challenges 
through altering their approach to emphasize physical tokens once it was deemed to be a 
popular choice amongst the residents of Singapore.  
 Over time, Singapore was able to create a stronger structure for its residents by 
integrating these technologies into everyday places and processes. Using DCT applications and 
tools has become embedded into the community, shifting into a necessary instrument for 
residents when entering/exiting public venues. The government made the reopening of the 
economy dependent on the widespread uptake of the TraceTogether application, among other 
measures. With over 78% of residents now using this technology and applications, what 
happens to this information is of significant public interest.  
TraceTogether vs. SafeEntry  
Essentially, TraceTogether encompasses the “who” while SafeEntry embodies the 
“where” within the DCT process. The BlueTrace open-source protocol that is behind 
TraceTogether is audited and has gone through major extents to establish the rhetoric that the 
platform has secure, privacy preserving features. By being offline, not using GPS, and not having 
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the ability to track live locations, the data associated appears less intrusive. Nonetheless, it 
requires every user’s knowledge and consent, and the Ministry of Health’s (or MOH) keys to use. 
The same can not be said for the SafeEntry platform, which has managed to fly under the radar 
in comparison to the critique on TraceTogether. The SafeEntry platform stores data on a 
government server rather than user devices. SafeEntry has its own separate privacy statement 
which states, “we may share necessary data with other Government agencies, so as to serve you 
in the most efficient and effective way unless such sharing is prohibited by law”. No further 
elaboration is given, leaving the policy very vague. With the situation now being that users need 
to use SafeEntry and TraceTogether together as complements, this has grown to become 
another privacy concern.  Luckily, with the recent passing of the COVID-19 Amendment Bill, 
Singapore has better clarified these boundaries to safeguard and secure the public’s data.  
Conclusion 
 This research has gone into depth about how Singapore strategically managed the 
COVID-19 virus by being one of the leading innovators to use DCT tools and technologies. We 
look at how TraceTogether (and SafeEntry) is currently flourishing within Singapore now that we 
are at the start of 2021, in comparison to when the applications were launched at the start of 
the pandemic and why. Stemming off of our assessments, further research can be conducted on 
the effectivity of TraceTogether as well as SafeEntry platforms now that the adoption rates have 
surged over the sufficient levels that are said to be needed for effectivity and efficiency. Data 
can be contrasted to show changes from before and after the government announced these 
tools would be mandatory for entry/exit of public venues. Now that the appropriate bills have 
been passed to further safeguard user/data privacy, additional inquiry can also be made on how 
attitudes towards DCT technologies have shifted in comparison to before the legislation was put 
into place. It would be notable to assess how this has affected or impacted user resistance and 
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adoption of the TraceTogether application, tokens, and SafeEntry. Furthermore, these findings 
can be extended to juxtapose with COVID-19 infection rates/positive cases in Singapore to test 
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• Recognition for crisis response 
• being open-sourced 
• Government support, backing, 
enforcement 
• Government trust and loyalty 




• COVID-19 Amendment bill 
WEAKNESSES 
• Time pressures 
• Transparency 
• Slow degree of adoption 
• Technical compatibility 
• Apple IOS, running apps in 
foreground/background 
• Battery drainage 
• Bluetooth proximities 
• Trade-off between privacy and utility 
• Balancing adoption and 
increasing function 
• Measurement error, Lack of data, 
studies, and proof in effectiveness 
• Decryption, centralized database 
OPPORTUNITIES 
• Learning from other models and 
developments 
• Showcasing Singapore’s Smart Nation 
Initiative to the world 
• Utilizing government power and 
influence 
• Change in promotion tactics, PR, 
media 
• Educating and exemplifying 
effectiveness to the public 
• Expanding complementary 
technologies 
• Incorporating both GPS alongside 




• Circuit break / quarantine / mandates 
• Emerging technologies of surveillance 
• Increased risk of misuse of 
technology and privacy 
breaches, CPC 
• Substitute apps, technologies, and 
platforms  
• Digital divide 
• False positives 
• Managing user expectations 
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